

ball de Monserrat sobre el *De Homine*. Per tant, si bé l'edició crítica de les obres de Hobbes encara no s'ha enllestit, la present

edició catalana del *De Homine* és ja una eina d'accés clau en la nostra llengua a aquesta part dels textos originals.

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ESPINOZA LOLAS, Ricardo (2023)

Psychoanalysis for Intersectional Humanity. Sade Reloaded

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With the recent boom in gender studies (and not only gender), a general interest in terms such as “queer”, “non-binary” or “intersectionality” has also increased. But this sudden popularity immediately brings with it a process of semantic emptying that eventually leads to trivialisation. The clearest evidence of this could easily be found in journalistic prose, not to mention the usual pseudo-political discourse. This is the reason why *Psychoanalysis for Intersectional Humanity* immediately disconcerts, and even astounds, the reader: approaching it requires an intellectual effort that removes any hint of obviousness from terms such as the ones mentioned above. This does not mean getting bogged down in “mere concepts”, because concepts, if they are not trivial, unfold their functional potential; in this case, a “clinical practice”.

The scope of this non-obviousness can be outlined as follows: In Espinoza Lolas' theoretical framework, “queer” is the same as “differential”, the multiple dimensions and nuances of which can be understood from Nietzsche, Ancient Greece, Hegel, a Sade whose inadequacies make him Hegelian, psychoanalysis (Lacan, Winnicott, Klein...) and the Slovenian School's reading of Hegel and Lacan, whose interpretative one-sidedness demands to be relativised from Butler's, and vice versa. (To put it briefly: Žižek

lacks the “dynamic” element and Butler the “structural” one).

This resolute break with the spontaneous meaning of words – which is always dictated by power – allows us, on the one hand, to fathom the apparent heterogeneity of references contained in the text and, on the other, to grasp why this book, in itself, is not enough to comprehend what it itself brings into play. Indeed, what we find here is a subtle variation on the same theme that presides over the recent *Ariadna. Una interpretación queer* (Herder, 2023), to the extent that, in order to see why Dionysus (“*to deinon*”) appears (chapter 4) as “an initial way of naming the Real” (p. 3), we need to invoke Ariadne, who only arises in the mode of a fleeting mention that, nevertheless, permeates everything from its radical distance (cf. p. 50).

Let us consider the decisive question. Espinoza Lolas' central barb against psychoanalysis (even against philosophy) consists in a redefinition of “perversion” together with “queer” (i.e. the monstrous, “*to deinon*”), in such terms that even “neurosis” becomes subtly redefined as “labyrinth” (Nietzsche) or “immediacy” (Hegel), so that the piercing of it and from it (the perverse attitude) passes through the “lament” (Nietzsche), which signifies the “mediation” or “negation” – determined, not abstract – (Hegel) that ultimately enables the “dance” (Nietzsche).

The main virtue of the rhetorical key that we have just used is its ability to shed light on Nietzsche's relevance, even though explicit references to him seem to be rather scarce. In this regard, it is worth noting that one of the multiple figures for which Espinoza Lolas expresses perversion – others include, for example, Bowie's music (chapter 3) and Goya's engravings (chapter 8) – is "an expectation that is maintained as such" (chapter 2), whose Nietzschean character is not thematised until the last chapter of the book. Here, in dialogue with Hegel, we are offered, as if in passing, a fragment from *The Gay Science* that begins by saying: "Here I was, waiting, waiting – but waiting for nothing" (p. 109).

At this point, the fact that the tools for a full understanding of perversion are provided neither by Freud nor by Lacan but by Hegel and, implicitly, by Nietzsche suggests that a fundamental shift has taken place in the conceptualisation of the category. The reason why Sade, Lacan and the Slovenian School ultimately recoil from the transgression of the law from within the law itself (the reason why they fail to move neurosis internally) is to be sought in the Kantian imprint, the persistent Kantian trait that overshadows and weakens the Hegelian drive, which, nevertheless, nourishes Lacan's last teachings and the work of the Slovenians: while Sade remains imprisoned in a "rational rigid binary scheme of 'good and bad'" (p. 106), Lacan and the Slovenians fail to completely free the Real from the "rock" of the "thing in itself". Unlike them,

Hegel does not want anything more to do with that "Thing in itself" that is said in multiple ways and does not stop trapping us in a fantasy that drags us along for centuries. And that reappears again and again, as in Lacan's Real and from there it finds and does not find the human at the end of the 20th century and that continues to this day with Miller and Žižek. (p. 110)

These considerations allow us to see what is at stake here: the proposal of a new clinic, a "materialist clinic" (p. 19) – which implies a new conception of the Real more indebted to Hegel and Nietzsche than to Lacan; a clinic capable of dissolving from within (from the plane of immanence of the symbolic) the late-capitalist labyrinth, like the perverse Nietzschean madman who announces the death of God, of the Father (cf. p. 83), precisely in the sphere in which capitalist competition unfolds, i.e. the market, without ever losing sight of the fact that inherent in the neurotic dynamic of capitalism is the failure to recognize in any way its nihilistic character, "the nonsense that constitutes all things" (p. 83).

We will conclude this brief review by quoting a fragment from Clarice Lispector that could undoubtedly have been written by Espinoza Lolas himself:

Lori, one of the things I've learned is that one must live regardless [*apesar de*]. Regardless, one must eat. Regardless, one must love. Regardless, one must die. In fact, what often keeps us going is exactly this 'regardless'. It was this 'regardless' that gave me the anguish of dissatisfaction that created my very life.¹

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1. *An Apprenticeship or the Book of Delights*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1986, p. 11. In the translation quoted above, the Portuguese locution "apesar de" is translated as "no matter what", a choice we do not agree with; hence we have opted instead for "regardless".